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Abstract
The paper presents the ¯rst ex-post analysis of pro¯t and productivity of individual
vessels following a vessel or licence buyback in a ¯shery. Using individual ¯rm-level
data for the period 1997-2000, the paper analyzes a \natural experiment" of the e®ects
of a 1997 scheme to reduce ¯shing capacity in the South East trawl ¯shery of Australia.
The scheme was unique in the sense that the buyback was implemented in a ¯shery
managed by individual vessel tradeable harvesting rights rather than input controls.
Using an innovative index method that decomposes the contributions of output prices,
input prices, vessel size and productivity to relative pro¯ts, the economic performance
of vessels is analyzed in the year of the buyback and for three years afterwards. Pro¯ts
for all vessel classes rose over the period 1997-2000 following the 1997 buyback of
27 ¯shing licences, but some of the gains were due to a rise in output prices that
were independent of the adjustment program. All vessel classes (small and large)
also experienced substantial productivity gains immediately following the 1997 licence
buyback with an average increase over all vessels of 39%. This increase, coincident
with a decline in catch per unit of e®ort for key species, provides strong support that
the buyback was successful at improving economic performance. Ongoing productivity
improvements for small vessels over the period 1998-2000 following the buyback is
attributed to the existence of individual tradeable harvesting rights in the ¯shery.
1 Introduction
Many ¯sheries su®er from excess capacity (Kirkley, Morrison Paul and Squires 2002) despite
the use of input controls and limits on the total number of vessels. The consequences of excess
capacity include increased harvesting pressure on ¯sh stocks and an ine±cient allocation of
resources. A common approach of regulators in input-controlled ¯sheries is to temporarily
address the problem of overcapitalization with a buy back of vessels, gear and/or licences so
as to reduce aggregate ¯shing e®ort. Such approaches are often supported by ¯rms provided
the buybacks are voluntary and ¯nanced by persons outside of the industry.
Typically, buybacks are funded by taxpayers and when voluntary the less technically
e±cient vessels predominate in terms of the ¯shing capacity removed (Pascoe and Coglan
2002). Despite their use in ¯sheries in Canada, the United States, the European Union,
Japan, Taiwan, Norway and Australia (Holland, Gudmundsson and Gates 1999), and costing
millions of dollars, until now there has been no study that quantitatively analyzes the e®ects
of a buyback on the pro¯ts and productivity of the vessels remaining in a ¯shery.
Using a unique data set from the South East trawl ¯shery of Australia and a recent
innovation that decomposes pro¯ts into contributions due to productivity, output prices,
input prices and (quasi-) ¯xed inputs, the paper provides an assessment of individual vessel
economic performance following a 1997 licence buyback. Section 2 of the paper describes
the ¯shery and the details of the buyback program. Section 3 outlines the general method
used to analyze ¯rm-level economic performance and section 4 describes the decomposition
approach for the particular ¯shery. Section 5 provides an assessment of the impacts of the
licence buyback on economic performance by vessel class. The paper concludes with a review
of the results and their implications for buyback programs in general.
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2 Capacity Reduction and Australia's South East Trawl
Fishery
The South East Trawl Fishery (SETF) is located in Australia's 200 nautical mile exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) and stretches over a very large area of ocean from a latitude south
of Sydney to encompass all of Australia's oceans o® the coasts of Victoria and Tasmania
until just beyond the eastern border of South Australia. The ¯shery is one of Australia's
oldest, one of its most regulated and is managed by the Australian Fisheries Management
Authority (AFMA). Its one hundred or so ¯shers employ trawls (otter board, Danish seine
and mid-water trawl) and harvest over a hundred di®erent types of species. Overall, the
¯shery accounted for about one ¯fth of the landed value of commonwealth ¯sheries, or over
AUS$70 million in 1999-2000.
Over the past couple of decades the participants in the ¯shery have increased their vessel
size and capacity. In part, these investments have been made to access deeper water and
further o®shore ¯sheries, such as the orange roughy, but have also occured because ¯shers
have competed for a limited total allowable catch by increasing their e®ective ¯shing ef-
fort. Due to concerns about overcapitalization, input controls were introduced in 1986 that
established vessel unitization whereby every boat was registered in terms of its hull and
engine size, de¯ned as boat units. Owners wishing to upgrade their vessels were required to
purchase registered units from other operators with an \o®set" amount to prevent overall
increases in ¯shing power.
Vessel unitization and input controls failed to prevent an increase in the capital employed
in the ¯shery. To help prevent further increases in capacity, AFMA introduced individual
transferable quotas (ITQs) in 1992 that encompassed 16 of the major commercial species
in the ¯shery. The initial allocation of ITQs was contentious as some ¯shers considered
their allocations as insu±cient compensation for their loss of previous ¯shing entitlements
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associated with their boat units. The introduction of ITQs also failed to bring about the
hoped for reduction in the number of vessels operating in the ¯shery with relatively low
levels of quota traded in the ¯rst ¯ve years of the ITQ program.
Acrimony from the initial allocations, and a concern that ITQs had not delivered the
expected bene¯ts to all ¯shers, led the regulator to institute a permit or licence buyback
in 1997. The buyback had a dual purpose: one, to remedy the acrimony over the initial
allocation and its associated uncertainty and litigation and, two, to reduce the perceived
overcapacity in the ¯shery. In total, about AUS$4 million was spent in the buyback that
included $2.35 million of targeted assistance to 18 ¯shers designed to avoid further legal
action over the initial quota allocation and $1.7 million to buy back the ¯shing licences of
27 ¯shers (AMC Search Ltd.), with seven ¯shers receiving both a buyback of their licences
and targeted ¯nancial assistance.
The licence buyback removed 14 active licences and 13 dormant or latent licences from the
¯shery. The result was to reduce the number of active ¯shing vessels from 108 to 94 and to
remove vessel capital worth approximately AUS$7 million (AMC Search Ltd.). The buyout
was perceived to improve the pro¯tability in the ¯shery, as re°ected in the boat licence to
participate in the ¯shery, that rose in value from AUS$60,000 to AUS$85,000 immediately
following the licence retirement. The 1997 buyback also coincided with the establishment of
a limited brokerage service, with government assistance, that greatly increased the level of
lease quota trading relative to the period 1992-96. For example, average yearly lease quota
trades increased by more than 50% to 26,000 tonnes in the period 1997-200 compared to the
preceding 5 years.
Despite the large expenditures on removing vessels and targeted ¯nancial assistance, no
study has been undertaken to assess the impact on the economic performance of ¯shers.
Indeed, as far as we are aware, despite the combined expenditure of many millions of dollars
worldwide in the past three decades on vessel, gear and licence buybacks, our study is the
3
¯rst ex-post assessment of the impact of a buyback on individual vessel pro¯tability and
productivity.
3 Method for Decomposing Firm-Level Pro¯ts
The approach used to decompose relative pro¯ts and analyze productivity changes in the
South East trawl ¯shery is described in detail in Fox, Grafton, Kirkley and Squires (2003).
It o®ers important advantages over traditional measures of productivity in ¯sheries (Squires
1992; Jin et al 2002) in that it provides individual ¯rm-level measures and quanti¯es the
contribution of productivity, inputs and outputs to relative pro¯ts. Thus it provides an easy
way to assess both ¯rm and industry performance at a point in time and over time.1
We brie°y review the pro¯t decomposition approach using index numbers. We de¯ne the
restricted pro¯ts of an arbitrary ¯rm b, ¼b, relative to the restricted pro¯ts of another ¯rm
a, ¼a:
µa;b ´ ¼b=¼a: (1)
A productivity index between ¯rms b and a, denoted by Ra;b, can also be de¯ned as the
ratio of an output index and input index between ¯rms a and b , i.e,
Ra;b ´ (µa;b=P a;b)=Ka;b; (2)
where the numerator is an implicit output index (Allen and Diewert, 1981), P a;b is a price
index where variable inputs are treated as negative outputs and Ka;b is an input quantity
index. Productivity de¯ned by (2) is the di®erence in the output quantity index that cannot
be explained by di®erences in input utilization. By rearranging Equation (2), we obtain the
following pro¯t decomposition
µa;b = P a;b ¢Ra;b ¢Ka;b: (3)
Using (3), the ¯rms' relative pro¯ts can be de¯ned in terms of contributions from output
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prices (P a;b), productivity (Ra;b), and the input (Ka;b) without making any behavioural
assumptions or restrictions on the speci¯c form of the technology used by ¯rms.
To apply the decompositions in the South East trawl ¯shery, we ¯rst de¯ne pb = (pb1; : : : ; p
b
M)
as a price vector for vessel b of netput prices speci¯ed for M variable \netputs," denoted by
yb = (yb1; : : : ; y
b
M). In the netput vector, if y
b > 0 the good is an output, but if yb < 0 the good
is a variable input. The vector of (quasi-) ¯xed input prices for vessel b is rb = (rb1; : : : ; r
b
N),
where there are N ¯xed inputs, denoted by kb = (kb1; : : : ; k
b
N). Both price vectors satisfy the
requirement that each element is positive.
As shown by Fox, Grafton, Kirkley and Squires (2003), the TÄornqvist (1936) index has a
number of useful properties for constructing the price and ¯xed-input indexes for use in (3).
Using the TÄornqvist index, P a;b and Ka;b in (3) can be denoted as netput price and quantity
indexes and are de¯ned by (4) and (5), where sm = (pmym)=(
P
pmym) is the pro¯t share of
netput m and sn = (rnkn)=(
P
pmym) is the pro¯t share of ¯xed input n, i.e.,
lnP a;b ´
MX
m=1
1
2
(sbm + s
a
m) ln(p
b
m=p
a
m); (4)
and
lnKa;b ´
NX
n=1
1
2
(sbn + s
a
n) ln(k
b
n=k
a
n): (5)
The multiplicative nature of the TÄornqvist index allows us to decompose the aggregate
price and ¯xed-input indexes between vessels a and b into a product of individual price and
input di®erences, i.e.,
P a;b =
MY
m=1
P a;bm (6)
and
Ka;b =
NY
n=1
Ka;bn ; (7)
where the index for each netput m and ¯xed-input n is itself a TÄornqvist index. In this
manner, equations (3), (6) and (7) collectively represent a detailed decomposition of pro¯ts
between ¯rms a and b.2 Using these pro¯t decompositions, we can derive individual measures
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of relative pro¯ts over time and the contributions to relative pro¯ts from input and output
prices, changes in vessel size and productivity.
4 Pro¯t Decompositions and Productivity
The pro¯t decomposition method is applied to the South East trawl ¯shery using vessel-
level data on the implicit output price, fuel price, price for labor and a capital measure
represented by vessel tonnage. The sample data was obtained by the Australian Bureau
of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) and AFMA and is an unbalanced panel
of 47 vessels over the period 1997-2000 giving a total of 131 observations.3 Due to data
inconsistencies, 11 observations were dropped leaving a total of 120 observations to calculate
the pro¯t decompositions.
Provided there is only one (quasi-) ¯xed input, pro¯ts are all attributed to the (quasi-)
¯xed input and sn, or the share of capital in pro¯t in (5), is unity. Thus the (quasi-) ¯xed
quantity index de¯ned by (5) reduces to the following,
Ka;b = kb=ka: (8)
Variable inputs in the ¯shery are fuel (F) and labor (L). From equations (3), (6) and (7),
our decomposition of the pro¯t ratio between vessel a and vessel b, (b = 1; : : : ; 120), µa;b is
given by (9)
µa;b = Ra;b ¢ POa;b ¢ PLa;b ¢ PF a;b ¢Ka;b: (9)
In this pro¯t decomposition the performance of vessel b relative to vessel a can be decomposed
into di®erences due to productivity (Ra;b), output (POa;b), variable inputs (PLa;b and PF a;b)
and vessel capital (Ka;b).
Individual prices per species per vessel are not available for the ¯shery. Consequently, for
each vessel the price is de¯ned as the total value of landings of ¯sh from vessels divided by the
total weight of the ¯sh landed. This data limitation prevents us from assessing the relative
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pro¯t contributions of the di®erent ¯sh species, but does not restrict us from assessing the
overall impact of ¯sh returns on individual and industry performance. Nor does it prevent
us from applying the pro¯t decomposition to assess the contribution of harvests to relative
pro¯ts. PLa;b is an implicit labor price de¯ned as total vessel labor payments divided by
the number of trawling hours multiplied by the number of crew. PF a;b is a recorded price
of fuel for the vessels and Ka;b is the vessel gross registered tonnage.
For common-pool resources, an important issue to consider is the e®ect of the natural
capital stock on pro¯ts and productivity. Data limitations on the stock assessment of the
species in the ¯shery, however, preclude us from separating out the e®ects of changes in
biomass from other changes over the four years of the sample data. As a result, measures of
changes in productivity are not conditioned on the level of stock abundance. Although this
limits our ability to discern what factors may have led to changes in productivity perfor-
mance, it does not prevent us from analyzing whether ¯shers experienced productivity gains
following the buyback, or the relative contributions of changes in prices and vessel size to
relative pro¯ts over the period 1997-2000.4
For comparative purposes, a reference ¯rm (a) must be chosen. Using a benchmark that
is an observed ¯rm or vessel helps ¯shers to better assess those factors that are constraining
pro¯ts that are under their control (such as productivity) from factors that are not (such as
fuel prices). A natural benchmark vessel is one that maximizes pro¯t relative to all other
vessels and over all periods which is observation 26 from a total of 28 observations in 2000.
The pro¯t decompositions are presented in Tables 2 through 4 for the years 1997-2000.
Geometric means of the index numbers are given in Table 6. To assist in the evaluation of
the decompositions, the pooled index series are plotted in Figure 1, where the observations
for each of the four years are separated by vertical dotted lines. When comparing the
index values, if an index takes a value greater (less) than one, it contributes by expanding
(contracting) the pro¯t ratio, µ. For the reference ¯rm, observation 26 in 2000, its index
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values are unity and the index values for all other ¯rms are relative to this benchmark.
A value of less than one for the output price index indicates that the contribution of the
output price to pro¯t is less than in the benchmark ¯rm. Only four observations have a PO
greater than unity, and most vessels have values considerably less than unity. This suggests
that an important factor contributing to the pro¯ts of the benchmark vessel was the price
it received for its harvest. A value greater than one for the input indexes does not imply
that the input prices are more than for the benchmark vessel. Rather, it indicates that the
contribution of that input price to the pro¯t ratio is greater than for the benchmark vessel.
This could arise if the input price for the given vessel is less than that of the reference ¯rm
as an increase in the fuel price reduces pro¯ts. If the input price for a given vessel is identical
to the benchmark vessel, the corresponding price decomposition index will be unity.
To illustrate that the pro¯t decompositions are contributions to pro¯ts and not absolute
ratios, Figure 2 presents the ratios of output and variable input prices and quantities relative
to the benchmark ¯rm. Although these ratios provide information on the variability of
these measures across vessels and periods, they do not provide insight into what may be
contributing to relative pro¯tability. Moreover, these ratios cannot be used to construct a
meaningful index of total factor productivity.
5 Pro¯ts, Productivity and the Vessel Buyback
Observation of the pro¯t decompositions reveals a number of insights about vessel perfor-
mance in the ¯shery. Figure 1 presents the pro¯t decompositions by observation and by
period where vessels in each period are ranked in ascending order based on vessel tonnage.
Scatter plots of the PO index suggest that the contribution to pro¯ts from the implicit out-
put price are higher for larger vessels and that its importance for all vessels rises over time.
This is con¯rmed in Table 6 with the geometric mean for PO for all vessels rising from 0.194
and 0.238 in 1997 and 1998 to 0.379 and 0.371 in 1999 and 2000. In addition, the mean for
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large vessels is higher for all years than for small vessels. No noticeable trends appear for
any of the variable inputs (PL and PF) across vessel sizes or over time.
The rise in the contribution of productivity to pro¯ts of small vessels explains why the gap
in the mean of the pro¯t ratio for large and small vessels narrowed substantially between
1997-1998 and 1999-2000. In other words, improvements in relative productivity of the
smaller vessels explains why the pro¯tability of smaller vessels has increased relative to
larger vessels, although large vessels still remain more pro¯table overall.
It would seem, therefore, that a goal of the regulator to raise economic performance
has been realized. The extent to which this improvement is attributable to the licence
buyback, however, is not immediately clear. The pro¯tability of both small and large vessels
improved over the period 1997-2000 due to a rise in output prices, but this was independent
of the buyback because the ¯shery has been managed by ITQs since 1992 that control the
total landings of ¯shers. In other words, the buyback may have changed the distribution of
returns in the ¯shery, but would not have changed the aggregate returns. A possibility exists,
however, that the establishment of a limited brokerage ¯rm (separate to the licence buyback)
for trading quota in 1997 may have stimulated increases in output prices by allowing ¯shers
to adjust their harvests to better suit market conditions and their catches. This possibility
is supported by the fact that annual lease quota trades increased by over 50% for the period
1997-2000 compared to the period 1992-96.
If the vessel buyback and increased quota trading did have a positive economic bene¯t
to ¯shers, it should also have raised overall vessel productivity. The evidence from the
pro¯t decompositions is that productivity rose over the period 1997-2000, but only for small
vessels. To what extent the productivity changes are attributable to the vessel buyback and
increased quota trading cannot be precisely discerned because the results are not adjusted
for changes in ¯sh stocks. Nevertheless, the results indicate a very substantial increase in
productivity for both small and large vessels from 1997 to 1998, respectively, of 45% and
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30% which is coincident with the licence buyback and improved quota trading. Moreover,
such productivity gains were simultaneous with a decline in catch per unit of e®ort for seven
of the 16 quota species over the period 1997-1998 (AMS Search Ltd. 2000). Since 1998,
the contribution of productivity to pro¯ts for large vessels has fallen which may, in part, be
explained by declines in some of the major o®shore ¯sh stocks, such as orange roughy, that
are ¯shed by the larger vessels (Bureau of Rural Sciences 2002).
In sum, the empirical evidence provides support for the hypothesis that the licence buy-
back instituted in the ¯shery in 1997 has had a positive impact on pro¯tability via produc-
tivity improvements. Unlike vessel or licence buybacks implemented in other ¯sheries, such
as British Columbia's salmon ¯shery or the US northeast multispecies ¯sheries (Holland,
Gudmundosson and Gates 1999), it has occured within a ¯shery managed by individual and
transferable output controls. Thus the South East trawl ¯shery o®ers a unique \natural
experiment" where a buyback, coupled with ITQs, has provided on-going bene¯ts to ¯sh-
ers. Such bene¯ts do not appear to have diminished over time which might otherwise have
been the case if the ¯shery had been managed by only input controls|a type of ¯sheries
management that can result in both input substitution (Dupont 1991) and rent dissipation
(Dupont 1990). In other words, because the South East trawl ¯shery is managed by individ-
ual harvesting rights it appears to have avoided the incentive for ¯shers to increase ¯shing
e®ort that often follows buybacks (Campbell 1989; Weninger and McConnell 2000).5
6 Concluding Remarks
The paper presents the ¯rst ex-post analysis of ¯rm pro¯ts and productivity following a vessel
or licence buyback in a ¯shery. Using individual ¯rm-level data for the period 1997-2000,
the paper analyzes a \natural experiment" of the e®ects of a 1997 scheme to reduce ¯shing
capacity in the South East trawl ¯shery of Australia. The scheme was unique in the sense that
the buyback was implemented in a ¯shery managed by individual vessel tradeable harvesting
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rights rather than input controls. Using an innovative index method that decomposes the
contributions of output prices, input prices, vessel size and productivity to relative pro¯ts,
the economic performance of vessels is analyzed in the year of the buyback and for three
years afterwards.
The results indicate an enormous range in the relative pro¯ts and productivities of vessels
within the ¯shery and measurable di®erences across vessel sizes. In the three years following
the buyback, all vessels have bene¯ted from a rise in output prices, but this increase is
independent of the buyback program as the ¯shery has been regulated by output controls
since 1992. The results, however, do indicate a substantial increase in mean productivity
across all vessel classes immediately following the licence buyback, despite declines in catch
per unit of e®ort for key species in the ¯shery. Smaller vessels appear to have bene¯ted
the most from the changes with their mean contribution of productivity to pro¯ts rising 60
percent from 1997-98 to 1999-2000, while the productivity of large vessels in 2000 is virtually
unchanged from their pre-licence buyback level in 1997.
The ¯ndings suggest that the buyback, coupled with individual tradeable harvesting
rights, have been successful at improving economic performance. Such a desirable outcome
is in direct contrast to the long-term outcomes associated with vessel and licence buyback
in ¯sheries managed exclusively by input controls.
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End Notes:
1. However, our approach does not separate out the e®ects of changes in capacity uti-
lization (Jin et al. 2002) or technical change on productivity performance, although it
could be extended to do so given appropriate data.
2. For related index-number decompositions in di®erent contexts, see the seminal paper
by Diewert and Morrison (1986) and also Fox, Kohl and Warren (2002).
3. Only 17 of the 47 vessels are surveyed in all four periods. Prices are net of general
price changes through de°ation by the consumer price index.
4. If the data were available, a natural capital stock index could be calculated as the
available biomass per unit of the allowable harvest. Thus, for a stock-°ow production
technology, an increase (decrease) in the biomass, holding the allowable harvest ¯xed
and all other factors constant, should make it easier (harder) for ¯shers to catch the
allowable harvest and tend to increase (decrease) pro¯ts. Using the stock index it is,
therefore, possible to construct a resource adjusted measure of e±ciency (Fox, Grafton,
Kirk ley and Squires, 2003)
5. Weninger and McConnell (2000) show that the net welfare e®ects of a buyback de-
pends on the opportunity for remaining ¯shers to replace the removed capacity, the
irreversibility of their capital investments and the speed of replacement of ¯shing capi-
tal. Campbell (1989) observes that the net bene¯ts of a buyback varies positively with
the share of the restricted input(s) as a proportion of total costs and inversely with
the ability to substitute between restricted and unrestricted inputs.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Data on the South East Trawl Fishery
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
All Years
Revenue 485730 453259 86110 2467011
Landings 229164 182048 22266 1171634
Price 2.13 0.71 1.12 4.47
Crew Hours 3562 2391 128 14095
labor Price 75 106 15 684
Fuel Quantity 1175 1135 64 5312
Fuel Price 70 7.19 63 83
Vessel Tonnage 82 92 13 670
1997
Revenue 390518 378994 116996 2110863
Landings 215714 191165 31531 1051230
Price 1.88 0.69 1.12 4.45
Crew Hours 4129 2963 1276 14095
labor Price 42 24 15 129
Fuel Quantity 1056 1008 111 4078
Fuel Price 67 0.00 67 67
Vessel Tonnage 94 124 13 662
1998
Revenue 426822 383243 86110 2094586
Landings 229111 205366 38389 1171634
Price 1.91 0.55 1.22 4.47
Crew Hours 3654 2404 128 11829
labor Price 68 99 19 531
Fuel Quantity 1065 1001 107 4349
Fuel Price 63 0.00 63 63
Vessel Tonnage 73 52 13 196
1999
Revenue 571656 526541 98993 2467011
Landings 241148 181019 22266 889694
Price 2.39 0.77 1.44 4.45
Crew Hours 3197 1965 360 7245
labor Price 98 129 16 515
Fuel Quantity 1329 1296 98 4521
Fuel Price 69 0.00 69 69
Vessel Tonnage 94 123 13 670
2000
Revenue 568177 510214 105770 2336295
Landings 231226 149968 27093 615403
Price 2.38 0.69 1.24 3.90
Crew Hours 3223 2073 360 7038
labor Price 95 132 20 684
Fuel Quantity 1274 1260 64 5312
Fuel Price 83 0.00 83 83
Vessel Tonnage 94 124 13 662
Notes: There are 30 observations for 1997, 33 for 1998, 29 for 1999, and 28 for 2000. Landings are in the
total volume of ¯sh sold, in kilograms; Price is the average price for a kilogram of ¯sh landed; Crew hours
is the average number of crew times the number of trawling hour; Fuel Quantity is litres of fuel dispensed;
Fuel Price is the average diesel price for Melbourne; Vessel Tonnage is gross vessel tonnage (GVT).
Table 2: Decomposition of Pro¯t Ratios (µ), 1997
Obs Pro¯t µ R PO PF PL K
1 70758 0.045 1.063 0.167 1.018 3.713 0.068
2 44282 0.028 0.254 0.125 1.021 6.439 0.136
3 89039 0.057 0.076 0.887 1.018 4.838 0.173
4 79982 0.051 0.551 0.144 1.019 3.699 0.173
5 114085 0.073 0.471 0.216 1.020 3.985 0.178
6 41825 0.027 0.006 1.467 1.056 16.515 0.183
7 222867 0.143 0.700 0.469 1.022 2.269 0.188
8 111018 0.071 0.219 0.261 1.031 6.430 0.188
9 90375 0.058 0.281 0.155 1.035 6.498 0.199
10 103744 0.067 0.254 0.457 1.033 2.660 0.209
11 58257 0.037 0.271 0.158 1.023 4.081 0.209
12 85904 0.055 0.527 0.098 1.026 4.769 0.220
13 68112 0.044 0.312 0.136 1.029 4.361 0.230
14 230803 0.148 0.523 0.327 1.031 3.578 0.235
15 68845 0.044 0.092 0.146 1.054 12.795 0.246
16 46449 0.030 0.151 0.057 1.069 11.104 0.293
17 48848 0.031 0.018 0.080 1.127 63.301 0.314
18 82293 0.053 0.217 0.113 1.024 6.707 0.314
19 24682 0.016 0.096 0.022 1.087 21.596 0.314
20 75102 0.048 0.178 0.103 1.103 6.509 0.366
21 142183 0.091 0.473 0.102 1.061 4.898 0.366
22 70310 0.045 0.023 0.140 1.131 30.238 0.408
23 211007 0.136 0.104 0.412 1.055 6.241 0.481
24 166302 0.107 0.182 0.257 1.053 4.156 0.523
25 429122 0.276 0.416 0.321 1.046 3.400 0.580
26 280435 0.180 0.391 0.232 1.029 2.887 0.669
27 160346 0.103 0.125 0.247 1.058 4.164 0.758
28 297546 0.191 0.227 0.260 1.053 3.279 0.941
29 376475 0.242 0.308 0.191 1.028 4.164 0.962
30 1315549 0.846 1.549 0.372 1.024 1.400 1.025
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Table 3: Decomposition of Pro¯t Ratios (µ), 1998
Obs Pro¯t µ R PO PF PL K
1 86829 0.056 1.241 0.226 1.027 2.845 0.068
2 16898 0.011 0.042 0.155 1.133 13.313 0.110
3 55508 0.036 0.183 0.196 1.030 7.104 0.136
4 100832 0.065 0.396 0.193 1.027 4.791 0.173
5 94219 0.061 0.513 0.210 1.031 3.167 0.173
6 107753 0.069 0.435 0.228 1.034 3.808 0.178
7 71117 0.046 0.025 1.377 1.061 6.739 0.183
8 249416 0.160 0.783 0.451 1.036 2.328 0.188
9 60510 0.039 0.138 0.140 1.121 9.516 0.188
10 155553 0.100 0.673 0.206 1.039 3.501 0.199
11 108173 0.070 0.281 0.364 1.054 3.081 0.209
12 71802 0.046 1.401 0.209 1.032 0.732 0.209
13 112869 0.073 0.384 0.224 1.031 3.736 0.220
14 94994 0.061 0.424 0.207 1.036 2.927 0.230
15 175170 0.113 0.399 0.284 1.050 4.031 0.235
16 106950 0.069 0.175 0.214 1.070 6.974 0.246
17 105070 0.068 0.257 0.201 1.028 4.864 0.261
18 71132 0.046 0.235 0.135 1.078 4.559 0.293
19 94300 0.061 0.191 0.170 1.034 5.739 0.314
20 42500 0.027 0.154 0.079 1.106 6.466 0.314
21 157209 0.101 0.304 0.251 1.077 3.365 0.366
22 162236 0.104 0.569 0.113 1.088 4.074 0.366
23 124993 0.080 0.082 0.355 1.092 6.188 0.408
24 403648 0.260 0.600 0.363 1.049 2.441 0.465
25 423410 0.272 0.347 0.512 1.048 3.037 0.481
26 299533 0.193 0.390 0.298 1.063 2.982 0.523
27 575114 0.370 0.508 0.479 1.047 2.502 0.580
28 231265 0.149 0.308 0.158 1.112 4.116 0.669
29 158076 0.102 0.196 0.148 1.096 4.230 0.758
30 88383 0.057 0.013 0.184 1.134 22.644 0.899
31 346500 0.223 0.277 0.316 1.062 2.544 0.941
32 525067 0.338 0.358 0.290 1.045 3.244 0.962
33 1242506 0.799 2.496 0.301 1.041 0.997 1.025
17
Table 4: Decomposition of Pro¯t Ratios (µ), 1999
Obs Pro¯t µ R PO PF PL K
1 95612 0.061 0.640 0.525 1.018 2.676 0.067
2 78348 0.050 0.183 1.223 1.030 2.019 0.108
3 170551 0.110 1.241 0.229 1.017 2.223 0.170
4 158788 0.102 0.713 0.369 1.020 2.166 0.176
5 75908 0.049 0.130 0.291 1.040 6.862 0.181
6 319083 0.205 2.328 0.231 1.073 1.909 0.186
7 176897 0.114 0.518 0.360 1.025 3.031 0.196
8 150846 0.097 0.683 0.231 1.018 2.781 0.217
9 138419 0.089 0.951 0.185 1.016 2.186 0.227
10 139477 0.090 0.195 0.564 1.018 3.367 0.238
11 52075 0.033 0.054 1.308 1.039 1.895 0.243
12 274419 0.176 0.764 0.280 1.053 3.101 0.253
13 163293 0.105 0.631 0.199 1.015 3.197 0.258
14 293310 0.189 0.546 0.457 1.037 2.612 0.279
15 232226 0.149 0.395 0.435 1.040 3.000 0.279
16 80927 0.052 0.145 0.319 1.049 3.719 0.289
17 143426 0.092 0.346 0.235 1.021 3.588 0.310
18 818644 0.526 1.975 0.941 1.021 0.853 0.325
19 118230 0.076 0.131 0.240 1.060 6.315 0.362
20 67930 0.044 0.037 0.224 1.088 11.726 0.413
21 257383 0.165 0.194 0.656 1.038 2.723 0.460
22 192546 0.124 0.071 0.387 1.073 8.886 0.475
23 384738 0.247 0.826 0.242 1.038 2.311 0.516
24 186784 0.120 0.110 0.367 1.077 4.108 0.671
25 660626 0.425 0.458 0.677 1.033 1.821 0.728
26 81921 0.053 0.020 0.134 1.129 19.779 0.888
27 1001635 0.644 0.958 0.663 1.033 0.970 1.012
28 340356 0.219 0.128 0.436 1.072 2.862 1.278
29 1450059 0.932 0.513 0.605 1.029 0.835 3.502
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Table 5: Decomposition of Pro¯t Ratios (µ), 2000
Obs Pro¯t µ R PO PF PL K
1 64913 0.042 0.354 0.607 1.000 2.932 0.066
2 51205 0.033 0.180 0.717 1.000 2.375 0.107
3 174455 0.112 1.032 0.257 1.000 2.507 0.168
4 85654 0.055 0.788 0.132 1.000 3.057 0.173
5 52302 0.034 0.096 0.244 1.000 8.014 0.179
6 185908 0.120 1.057 0.230 1.000 2.682 0.184
7 210768 0.136 0.546 0.461 1.000 2.776 0.194
8 183056 0.118 0.920 0.260 1.000 2.295 0.214
9 123742 0.080 0.809 0.226 1.000 1.940 0.224
10 147108 0.095 0.321 0.481 1.000 2.613 0.235
11 62293 0.040 0.090 1.046 1.000 1.779 0.240
12 345517 0.222 0.670 0.513 1.000 2.589 0.250
13 121216 0.078 0.394 0.200 1.000 3.880 0.255
14 347852 0.224 0.677 0.447 1.000 2.682 0.276
15 237970 0.153 0.442 0.426 1.000 2.950 0.276
16 72522 0.047 0.124 0.302 1.000 4.365 0.286
17 138227 0.089 0.404 0.209 1.000 3.427 0.306
18 786485 0.506 3.040 0.697 1.000 0.743 0.321
19 120919 0.078 0.162 0.224 1.000 5.993 0.357
20 94309 0.061 0.027 0.289 1.000 16.867 0.454
21 146312 0.094 0.093 0.146 1.000 14.770 0.469
22 281465 0.181 0.736 0.177 1.000 2.720 0.510
23 542030 0.349 0.524 0.416 1.000 2.415 0.663
24 496239 0.319 0.291 0.738 1.000 2.065 0.719
25 129089 0.083 0.023 0.491 1.000 8.549 0.878
26 1555275 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
27 268126 0.172 0.072 0.530 1.000 3.601 1.262
28 899473 0.578 0.193 0.681 1.000 1.273 3.459
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Table 6: Decomposition of Pro¯t Ratios (µ), Means
Obs No. Pro¯t µ R PO PF PL K
All Years 120 234625 0.099 0.278 0.281 1.038 3.828 0.318
Small 73 121619 0.068 0.299 0.260 1.042 4.172 0.201
Large 47 401174 0.182 0.217 0.304 1.063 4.006 0.648
1997 30 173551 0.073 0.207 0.194 1.046 5.728 0.303
Small 19 88535 0.049 0.197 0.182 1.039 6.503 0.203
Large 11 320398 0.145 0.227 0.218 1.058 4.601 0.602
1998 33 203622 0.089 0.288 0.238 1.061 3.995 0.306
Small 20 99080 0.056 0.285 0.223 1.052 4.298 0.195
Large 13 364457 0.181 0.293 0.265 1.073 3.568 0.608
1999 29 286361 0.126 0.319 0.379 1.042 2.968 0.337
Small 17 161388 0.092 0.429 0.364 1.031 2.806 0.204
Large 12 293173 0.196 0.209 0.402 1.057 3.213 0.686
2000 28 283015 0.120 0.317 0.371 1.000 3.076 0.331
Small 17 153218 0.083 0.408 0.345 1.000 2.913 0.202
Large 11 483611 0.211 0.214 0.415 1.000 3.346 0.709
Note: The arithmetic mean is used to average over the pro¯t values, while the geometric mean is used to
average over the indexes. Vessel tonnage (K) is used to split up observations into \small" and \large" vessels.
Small vessels are de¯ned as those being lighter than the sample average(K < 0:318), and large vessels are
de¯ned as those being heavier than the sample average (K > 0:318). \No." denotes the number of vessels
in each year/size category.
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Figure 1: Profit-Ratio Decomposition
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Figure 2: Price and Quantity Relatives
